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L’articolo esamina la natura dei diritti alla casa nel Regno Unito. L’Au-
trice sostiene che nonostante questi diritti appaiano formalmente coerenti 
con gli obblighi internazionali e comunitari, in effetti essi non sono stati 
strutturati avendo in mente questa prospettiva. Il sistema di protezione di 
questi diritti è complesso e se è vero che esso non equivale a fi ssare un “di-
ritto alla casa” in senso stretto, nel complesso è prevista una serie di diritti 
azionabili per proteggere chi è privo di casa, per supportare i pagamenti 
per l’acquisto della casa, per riconoscere il diritto di proprietà e individua-
re standard minimi di tutela.
1. Introduction
Before I turn in detail to ideas about the right to housing, I thought 
it would be useful to provide some contextual background about the 
UK; fi rst in relation to social and legal rights in the UK and secondly 
in relation to housing provision. I should also add that the detail of 
my talk relates to England, rather than the other constituent parts of 
the UK.
It is important to point out that the UK has no written constitution. It 
is not possible therefore to point to a “right to housing” which is set 
down in some constitutional form. Indeed even if we were to have a 
written constitution, it seems unlikely that we would include within 
it detailed social or economic rights. Indeed amongst some politi-
cians and perhaps the public at large, there is a distinct suspicion 
of giving legal effect to broad social rights, as the UK opts out from 
(*) Relazione al Convegno “Diritti fondamentali e politiche dell’UE dopo Lisbona”, Uni-
versità degli studi “Gabriele D’Annunzio”, Chieti e Pescara, 6-7 maggio 2010.
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the Charter of Social Rights of Workers illustrated. Indeed at the time 
that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was being adopted by the EU 
in 2000 our then Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith wrote of it that 
economic and social rights are different because they are “usually 
non-justiciable” and by implication are less important than civil and 
political rights1.
However, in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights 
we have made a considerable change constitutionally. The Human 
Rights Act 1998 effectively incorporated the convention into UK law 
and made breach directly justiciable in the UK courts. I will return to 
the impact of this later.
It is a truism that most social policy is a product of the (long) history 
of that policy. This is particularly true of housing where policy deci-
sions have long-term impacts in terms of houses built and the rights of 
people living in them, which governments are often reluctant to alter, 
particularly to reduce. Accordingly, tenure structures are very much a 
product of the existing history. In the UK there has been a substantial 
change over the last one hundred or so years, but we can still see the 
history of that change in where we are now, which is a country where 
owner-occupation predominates, although this has probably peaked 
for the moment.
Historically we had a large public or social rented sector. This was 
initially primarily provided by local authorities. However there have 
been two trends over the last 30 years which have meant that the 
proportion of tenants in local authority housing has decreased from 
a high of about one-third down to the current 10%. This is fi rst the 
right to buy which was given to tenants of local authority properties 
in 1980, and secondly the quasi-privatisation of their stock through 
transfers to housing associations (not-for-profi t, often charitable land-
lords). Within the next few years it is likely that housing associations 
will provide a greater percentage of housing than local authorities.
Finally we also have a small private rented sector, which provides for 
some very different markets – from students to young professionals, 
(1) Lord GOLDSMITH, A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles, in Common Market 
Law Review, 38, 2000, p. 1201.
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but also at the bottom of the market for those who are unable to ac-
cess social renting.
Having given that background I want to turn to the substance of the 
paper which will cover the following issues:
– discussion of the nature of housing rights;
– housing rights in the UK;
– rights for the homeless;
– protection from eviction.
2. The nature of housing rights
Housing rights have been recognised at an international level through 
a number of international treaties. Most obviously at the international 
level we have art. 11 of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights which provides for a:
Right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his fam-
ily, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous 
improvement of living conditions.
At a European level there is also the revised European Social Charter 
which in article 31 sets an obligation on the state:
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to housing, the par-
ties undertake to take measures designed: to promote access to housing of 
an adequate standard, to prevent and reduce homelessness with a view to its 
gradual elimination, to make the price of access accessible to those without 
adequate resources.
To a certain extent this also plays out at an EU level with article 136 
of the EU Treaty making direct reference to the Social Charter. Further 
the more recent Charter of Fundamental Rights, at article 34:
recognises and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to 
ensure a decent existence for all those who lack suffi cient resources.
However, the EU level commitments are not subject to legislative pow-
ers, and can only be enforced through what we in the UK would refer 
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to as “soft law”. Further, in order to translate these broad aspirations 
into legal rights we need to break them down further to see what 
they might encompass. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, which is responsible for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the Covenant, has2 interpreted the right to adequate housing 
as incorporating a number of core elements:
– legal security of tenure;






3. Housing rights in the UK
Even at this level of specifi city, how far can it be said that the UK 
law encompasses a full enough set of housing rights, that it could be 
argued that there is a right to housing? I think it is important to rec-
ognise that housing is often referred to as the “wobbly pillar” of the 
welfare state3. Unlike, for example, education or health, we do not 
provide a universal service for all citizens. Housing rights therefore 
have to be considered not just in terms of a positive right to receive 
a service from the state, but also in terms of state interventions in the 
private market, for example to limit the rights of landlords or mort-
gage lenders to recover possession. The other point I would want to 
make before we turn to the construction of housing rights in the UK 
is that none of the UK policy documents over the last 30 years or so 
make reference to either international or EU obligations on housing. 
I think it is true to say that they have not driven the legal position as 
it has emerged in the UK.
(2) General Comment No. 4.
(3) See U. TORGERSON, Housing: The Wobbly Pillar under the Welfare State, in B. TURNER, 
J. KEMENY, L. LUNDQVIST (eds.), Between State and Market: Housing in the Post-Industrial 
Era (1987).
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How, therefore, is what we might term the suite of housing rights con-
structed in the UK? What we see is a great deal of legal complexity:
– we have a law which imposes duties directly on the state towards 
the homeless;
– we have, falling within our social assistance, various rights to help 
towards payment (rent or mortgage) for those who are unable to af-
ford to pay;
– protection from eviction is provided for nearly all occupiers of 
housing through a requirement for due process. Some occupiers gain 
form of security which prevent the landlord/lender from evicting at 
will – thus giving additional security;
– for tenants the law imposes certain minimum standards for the 
home as to repairs, overcrowding, freedom from risk in the home 
– the law imposes these whether the landlord is the state or private.
Finally it is worth noting that those rights which come directly from 
the state are not open to everyone who is lawfully in the country. 
There are complex laws (interacting with EU provisions) as to who 
has the right to assistance.
I am now going to focus on two of these to examine how far they can 
be said to provide a “right to housing”.
4. Rights for the homeless
Notwithstanding all my initial comments about a dislike of constitu-
tional and particularly social rights, the UK has probably one of the 
most comprehensive sets of laws in Europe imposing duties on the 
state towards the homeless. This fi rst became law as the Housing 
(Homeless Persons) Act 1977, and it is now contained in the Housing 
Act 1996, Part 7.
In order to qualify to assistance applicants have to satisfy a number of 
criteria. In brief these are:
– eligibility (immigration status);
– homelessness (quite a broad defi nition);
– priority need (generally not single people without vulnerability);
– not intentionally homeless.
If an applicant satisfi es the criteria, i.e. the applicant is eligible, home-
less, in priority need and not intentionally homeless, the local author-
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ity is under a duty to secure that accommodation is made available for 
the applicant and his or her family. This may initially be some form 
of temporary accommodation, but it can be long-lasting as the duty 
does not come to an end until the applicant has found some form 
of permanent housing. For most people who apply as homeless that 
permanent housing is an offer of accommodation of social housing, 
allocated through the local authority’s waiting list (which generally 
gives access also to housing association properties). Under Part 6 
of the Housing Act 1996 which governs the allocation of permanent 
housing, those who have been accepted as homeless must be given a 
“reasonable preference” when housing is allocated.
What is perhaps the most important element of the homelessness 
laws and makes them closest to a “right to housing” is as Fitzpatrick 
and Stephens put it in their international review of homelessness law 
and policy4.
England was highly unusual amongst the surveyed countries in providing, for 
some homeless groups, a legally enforceable right ...
Thus if an applicant applies to an authority and the authority has
 “reason to believe” the applicant is homeless, the authority cannot 
refuse to investigate and make a decision. If they make a favourable 
decision on all the criteria, the authority cannot refuse to secure ac-
commodation for the applicant. In cases of a failure to act the ap-
plicant can obtain an order from the court requiring the authority to 
do so.
This, however, is less advantageous to the homeless than might fi rst 
appear. The various criteria have a lot of discretion built in to them. 
It is for the authority to decide if a single applicant is “vulnerable” or 
if they have accommodation “which it is reasonable to continue to 
occupy” in deciding whether they are homeless. Thus the problem 
is not usually that authorities make no decision at all, it is that they 
make a negative decision based on the Act. In those circumstances 
(4) S. FITZPATRICK, M. STEPHENS, An International Review of Homelessness and Social 
Housing Policy (2007).
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an applicant may seek an internal review of the decision and if still 
unsatisfi ed may appeal the decision to the county court, but only on a 
“point of law”. The courts have on a number of occasions stated that 
it is not their role to substitute their decision-making for that of local 
authorities.
I want to ask one fi nal question relating to the rights of the homeless: 
how important are legal rights? I ask this in the context where the 
numbers applying as homeless have dropped dramatically over the 
last 7 years or so. We can illustrate this with a graph taken from the 
government’s own homelessness statistics5.
What we see from this graph is that the number of applicants rose 
signifi cantly in 2002/03. This was in the wake of the expansion of the 
priority need categories, in particular to encompass all homeless 16 
and 17 year olds. However, since then there has been a strong govern-
(5) CLG Table 638: www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatis-
tics/housingstatisticsby/homelessnessstatistics/livetables/.
Fig. 1. Decisions taken by local authorities on applications received from eligible 
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ment policy to try and reduce homelessness, in particular by getting 
local authorities to focus on prevention. Thus we see both the number 
of applications and the number of acceptances declining at about the 
same rate. If a government policy drive can have this effect on the 
numbers asserting their rights, it raises the question of how important 
the legal rights are.
5. Protection from eviction
Turning now to protection from eviction, as I mentioned earlier, nearly 
all eviction from residential accommodation requires a court order to 
be made legally. However, a court order is not much protection if the 
court must make the order if requested. So grafted on to this we have 
a system of “security” across different tenures. For owner-occupiers 
who have a mortgage, the court has power to suspend or postpone 
possession if the owner can show that he or she can pay the arrears 
within a reasonable period. For private tenants the security is much 
less. All tenants have a minimum security of six months, but unless 
the landlord offers a longer term (and many do not) then after this 
period the landlord is absolutely entitled to possession provided he 
serves the appropriate notice. This is in stark contrast to the position 
prior to 1989 where tenants of private landlords had a high degree 
of security.
For most tenants of social landlords, there is still a relatively high de-
gree of security for the majority. They can only be evicted if they are 
at “fault” (for example non-payment of rent) and then only if the court 
considers it reasonable to do so. The court may also postpone the 
possession on condition that for example arrears are paid. However, 
we have also seen the erosion of this security over the last 15 years or 
so. A number of new forms of tenancy have been introduced. These 
include for example the “introductory tenancy”. Under this all new 
tenants of a local authority have no security during the fi rst 12 months 
of the tenancy. Although the local authority has to give reasons for 
evicting a tenant, when the case goes to court provided the proce-
dural requirements have been met, the court, must grant possession. 
Other examples of a lack of security include a new demoted tenancy 
and tenancies for the homeless.
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It is in cases fi ghting this erosion and lack of security that it has seen 
arguments under the ECHR deployed. Article 8 provides that everyone 
has the right to “respect for his private and family life, his home and 
his correspondence”. The right is not absolute and art. 8(2) provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.
The House of Lords (recently reconstituted as the Supreme Court) in 
a series of cases has held that Article 8 leaves open two possible chal-
lenges to decisions to evict (known as Gateway (a) and Gateway (b)): 
see Lambeth LBC v Kay; Leeds City Council v Price [2006] 2 AC 465; 
UKHL 10; [2006] 2 WLR 570 and Doherty v Birmingham City Council 
[2009] 1 AC 367; [2008] UKHL 57; [2008] 3 WLR 636. Gateway (a) is a 
challenge to the compatibility of the legislation itself with the conven-
tion. Gateway (b) is a challenge to the individual decision if it is made 
by a “public body”. However, such individual challenges are to be 
made by judicial review, and therefore only on limited grounds.
In relation to Gateway (a) we see a split developing between the 
UK courts and the Strasbourg court. The UK courts have been very 
reluctant to intervene with the balance struck by Parliament between 
security and the right to possession. Lord Brown said in Kay:
... where under domestic law the owner’s right to possession is plainly made 
out (whether at common law or, for example, under the legislation providing 
for assured short-hold tenancies or introductory tenancies), the judge in my 
opinion has no option but to assume that our domestic law properly strikes 
the necessary balances between competing interests ... and that in applying it 
properly he is accordingly discharging his duty under section 6 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. ... Where no statutory protection is afforded to occupiers 
that should be assumed to be Parliament’s will: sometimes that will be clearly 
evident from the terms of the governing legislation ...;
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By contrast the European Court of Human Rights has increasingly 
found that a residential occupier should have the right to challenge in 
court the fact that the decision to evict is not proportionate. Thus in 
Qazi v. UK [2008] 47 EHRR 40; [2008] HLR 40 it was held that:
Judicial review procedure is not well adapted for the resolution of sensitive 
factual questions which are better left to the County Court responsible for 
ordering possession. In the present case, the judicial review proceedings, 
like the possession proceedings, did not provide any opportunity for an in-
dependent tribunal to examine whether the applicant’s loss of his home was 
proportionate under Art. 8(2) to the legitimate aims pursued.
So what is emerging here is a jurisprudence which suggests that even 
where there are no legal rights of security there should be the right 
to challenge the eviction as disproportionate in the court of fi rst in-
stance deciding whether or not to order the eviction. Whether the UK 
court will be willing to go down this route will become clearer in the 
next few months as the Supreme Court reconsiders again a number 
of cases of “insecure” tenants, but I would suggest the Court will be 
unwilling to upset the balance struck by Parliament.
Turning to Gateway (b), here the argument turns on the facts of the 
individual case being challengeable in public law. Under the Human 
Rights Act 1998, s. 6 it is “unlawful for a public authority to act in a 
way which is incompatible with a Convention right”. Lord Scott in Do-
herty v Birmingham City Council put the nature of the defence thus:
An article 8 defence requires the judge to review the lawfulness of the local 
authority’s decision to recover possession of the property in question and, 
in doing so, to review the factors that a responsible local authority ought to 
have taken into account in reaching its decision. The proportionality of the 
decision in all the circumstances of the case would be central to the review 
and if the local authority’s decision could be shown to be outside the range 
of reasonable decisions that a responsible local authority could take, having 
regard both to the circumstances of the defendant as well as to all the other 
relevant circumstances, the decision would be held to be unlawful as a mat-
ter of public law.
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However, it is only “public bodies” which can be challenged in this 
way. This raises an issue relating back to the very beginning of the 
paper, the quasi-privatisation of local authority housing. Are housing 
associations, as they increasingly take over local authority stock, and 
become the major provider of social housing, to be considered a pub-
lic authority? The statute states:
(3) In this section “public authority” includes – ...
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature, 
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising func-
tions in connection with proceedings in Parliament ...
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue 
only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.
This too has been the subject of recent litigation. In the case of the 
R (Weaver) v London and Quadrant Housing Trust [2009] EWCA Civ 
5, the Court of Appeal held that eviction was a housing manage-
ment function and that such functions when carried out by a hous-
ing association were functions of a public nature. The decision has 
been subject to much criticism (particularly from housing associations 
themselves who do not wish to be seen as part of the public sector) 
and it is likely to be considered by the Supreme Court fairly soon. 
Should the Supreme Court take a different approach (which has been 
suggested, is quite likely), it will indicate the limits of protection given 
by the Human Rights Act. With increasing “quasi”-privatisation of the 
provision of housing there will be no basis for a gateway (b) chal-
lenge.
6. Conclusions
In this paper I have sought to examine the nature of housing rights in 
the UK. I would argue that although they largely indicate compliance 
with our international and European obligations, they are not con-
structed with such compliance in mind. The system of protection is 
complex, and while it cannot be said to amount to a “right to housing” 
in a simplistic sense, it does on the whole provide a set of justiciable 
rights to protect the homeless, to assist in payment towards housing, 
to give security of tenure and to provide minimum standards.
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The peak is probably the rights of the homeless. Here I would sug-
gest that, despite the legislation’s limitations, the UK probably goes 
further than most other European states in providing a right enforce-
able against the state to the provision of accommodation. Nonetheless 
the limitations in terms of the discretionary decision-making must be 
acknowledged. Further recent changes in policy, with a move away 
from a reactive rights-based approach towards a preventative agenda, 
may lead one to question whether the legislation is the most effective 
way of providing assistance to the homeless.
In relation to security of tenure, a key component of a right to hous-
ing, the UK law provides a minimum level of protection. Some tenants, 
particularly of social landlords, have considerable security. As with 
the private rented sector two decades ago this is now being eroded. 
Because the European Convention on Human Rights has been incor-
porated into UK law, we have seen this used to try and defend against 
the erosion of such rights. In the UK this has been of limited success, 
although it remains to be seen how the clash with Strasbourg resolves 
itself. It has also thrown up the question of the nature of public au-
thorities, in an era of “quasi”-privatisation.
I just want to fi nish with a question to ponder coming out of the use 
of the ECHR to defend security. Should social rights become incorpo-
rated as “hard” law in the EU, would we similarly see them used to 
attack erosions of security?
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